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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether the court erred in affirming O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.’s
summary judgment on Plaintiff Peters’ claim of intrusion upon seclusion;
Whether the court erred in affirming O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.’s
summary judgment on Plaintiff Peters’ claim of violation of the Marshall
Human Rights Act.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Marshall County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in
favor of Respondent, O’Plenty Enterprises, in case number 11-C-1000.
The First District Court of Appeals for the State of Marshall affirmed the
Marshall County Circuit Court’s Order in case number 2011-016. The
Opinion and Order of the First District Court of Appeals are found on
pages 3–13 of the Record (“R.”).
STATEMENT OF THE JURISDICTION
Pursuant to section 1020(2) of the Rules for the 31st Annual International Moot Court Competition in Information Technology & Privacy
Law, the formal statement of jurisdiction has been omitted.
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The relevant statutory provision can be found in Appendix A of the
official record: Marshall Human Rights Act. (R. at 14, app. A).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

C M
Y K

10/02/2013 12:46:52

Jackson Peters is a life-long resident of Marshall. (R. at 4). He is a
hard-working individual who was employed as an at-will employee by
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. (“Respondent”) for ten years, beginning in
2000. (R. at 4, 6–7). Respondent is a large real estate development company that focuses on lower- to middle-class residential rental properties
in Marshall’s capital, Marshall City. (R. at 3–4). Taking advantage of
the financially troubled areas and the recent market crisis, Respondent
has enjoyed substantial economic gain, company growth, and expanding
control over Marshall City’s real estate. (R. at 4).
Peters began his career with Respondent as an entry-level employee;
however, he quickly worked his way through Respondent’s managementtraining program, and in 2009, Respondent’s founder and owner, Duffy
O’Plenty, promoted him to the position of Regional Project Supervisor.
(R. at 3, 5). Although Peters lived near company headquarters, Respon-
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THE CAMPAIGN EVENT
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Approximately one year after Peters was promoted to Regional Project Supervisor, Respondent informed Peters that starting in 2010, he
would be responsible for coordinating and facilitating various fundraising events for candidate Timmons, which would be held at the hotels
owned by Respondent in Petersville. (R. at 5). Further, these new responsibilities were in addition to Peters’s regular duties. (R. at 5). Although Respondent substantially increased Peters’s workload and
essentially forced him to support a candidate associated with public rep-
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dent assigned him to a territory located 200 miles away in the city of
Petersville—Peters’s hometown. (R. at 5).
Peters has an exceptional work ethic and employment record, but he
is more than just a “Regional Project Supervisor”; at times, he has been
known to tell his friends, “[M]y job is what I do, not what I am.” (R. at
4–5). In fact, Peters enjoys a life outside of the workplace, which until
recently, he was successful at keeping separate from his employer, Respondent—a life justifiably entitled to remain private. For example, Peters is involved in local politics, and he is a supporter of the incumbent
governor of Marshall, Ed Edison, in the 2012 election. (R. at 4–5). One
of Governor Edison’s platforms is a push to legalize same-sex marriage.
(R. at 5). Indeed, Edison’s position aligns with Peters’s because Peters is
in a long-term relationship with a member of the same sex. (R. at 6).
Additionally, Peters maintains various contacts with prominent gay activists in Marshall. (R. at 6).
To be clear, it is likely that Peters felt obligated to separate his personal life from his work life in this way because of Respondent’s clear
political and moral position against homosexuality. (R. at 4). It is important to note that at the time of the events giving rise to this case, Respondent was controlled and operated by its owner Duffy O’Plenty, who also
serves as the face of the company. (R. at 4). After withdrawing from his
own campaign for governor in the 2012 elections, Mr. O’Plenty focused
all of his efforts towards endorsing and supporting candidate Tom Timmons. (R. at 4). As expected, based on Mr. O’Plenty’s own beliefs, candidate Timmons adamantly opposes same-sex marriage. (R. at 4).
In addition to his financial contributions, Mr. O’Plenty provides various venues owned by Respondent for candidate Timmons’s fundraising
and campaign events. (R. at 4). In fact, Mr. O’Plenty personally spoke
on behalf of candidate Timmons during a 2010 event, where he publicly
expressed his views by stating, “Same sex marriage is unnatural. Homosexuality is a sin against God. It is unnatural and detrimental and ultimately destructive to the foundations of our society.” (R. at 4).
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rimand against individuals such as himself, Peters accepted the added
imposition. (R. at 5).
Understandably however, there were inherent limits to Peters’s acquiescence and cooperation, and after roughly four months of coordinating these events, the exhaustion and stress began to catch up to Peters.
(R. at 5). Aware that his performance was beginning to suffer, Peters
spoke with his supervisors on two separate occasions. (R. at 5–6). But,
Peters’s supervisors dismissed his concerns, claiming that the additional
responsibilities were merely a part of his job. (R. at 6).
Just as cautioned by Peters, however, the ancillary burdens from the
campaign activities took their toll. During Peters’s last visit to Petersville to coordinate an event for candidate Timmons, he was informed
that his dog had died unexpectedly. (R. at 6). Unfortunately, this unforeseeable event triggered an emotional distraction for Peters that, in
addition to his work-related stress, caused him to send the VIP list from
the prior week’s event to the hotel security for candidate Timmons’s
event (the “Event”). (R. at 6). Additionally, Peters forgot to arrange
transportation for candidate Timmons. (R. at 6).
Although a mistake was undoubtedly made, it resulted in only a
thirty-minute delay to the Event. (R. at 6). Candidate Timmons, however, characterized the Event as a “fiasco” and called Mr. O’Plenty directly to complain. (R. at 6). Thereafter, Respondent informed Peters
that he had forty-eight hours to fly back to headquarters and submit a
detailed report of the Event. (R. at 6).
THE MISSING LAPTOP

10/02/2013 12:46:52
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Considerably flustered and upset by the unusual events that had
transpired, Peters hurriedly checked out of his hotel room, but when he
arrived at the airport, he realized that his company-issued laptop computer was missing. (R. at 6). Pursuant to company policy, Peters immediately called Respondent’s help line to report the missing laptop. (R. at
6). Fortunately the next morning, Peters received a call from the hotel
manager who had found the laptop and had shipped it to him. (R. at 6).
As soon as the laptop arrived later that morning, Peters called Respondent to report that he had found the laptop. (R. at 6). But, Respondent’s Information Technology (“IT”) department did not answer the call,
forcing Peters to leave a voicemail message. (R. at 6). Still under the
forty-eight hour deadline imposed by Respondent, Peters began working
on the Event report in his home office. (R. at 6). Unbeknownst to Peters
however, his company-issued laptop was surreptitiously taking photographs of him through a hidden webcam that had been installed by Respondent. (R. at 5–6). It is undisputed that Respondent is entirely
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THE TERMINATION
Shortly after the Event, while Peters was still oblivious as to what
information had been involuntarily disclosed to Respondent, Respondent
suspended Peters pending an investigation of the Event. (R. at 7). During the suspension, Peters was isolated from his peers at work, and on at
least two occasions, his co-workers failed to invite him to company-sanctioned events. (R. at 7). Finally, three weeks after Respondent had
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1. Section 2.6 provides the following: “Company reserves the right to initiate and activate tracking software in order to track lost or stolen any type of company issued electronic
equipment.” (R. at 14, app. A) (emphasis added).

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 99 Side A

responsible for installing the software on Peters’s computer without his
knowledge.
Approximately eight months earlier, Respondent installed a
software program called Lost & Found® on all of its mobile electronic
devices, including Peters’s laptop. (R. at 5). The Lost & Found® technology is designed to remain innocuous and dormant during normal day-today use, but when Respondent so desires, it can trigger the spyware
technology from a remote location, thereby activating an embedded webcam. (R. at 5). The webcam then takes photographs of both the user of
the device and the device’s screen. (R. at 5). The software is programmed to take these photographs at five-minute intervals while the user is
connected to the Internet; the photographs are immediately sent to Respondent’s web server, where they are forwarded to Respondent’s
Human Resources department as well as to Mr. O’Plenty himself. (R. at
5–6). Moreover, once the Lost & Found® technology is activated by Respondent, the software continues to retrieve photographs of the device’s
user until Respondent decides to deactivate it. (R. at 5). Consequently,
after Respondent triggered the hidden webcam (and after Peters had reported his laptop missing), Respondent continued to receive photographs
of Peters in his home office until Peters’s voicemail was received—approximately four hours and nearly fifty photographs later. (R. at 6).
Importantly, Peters was wholly unaware that Respondent had taken
pictures of the contents inside his home, including (1) several rainbow
flags symbolizing the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender movement
and (2) several pictures on the wall behind Peters’s desk that revealed
both Peters’s political acquaintance with a prominent gay activist who
opposed candidate Timmons as well as Peters’s relationship with his
same-sex partner. (R. at 6). Although Peters was familiar with section
2.6 of Respondent’s Employee Handbook (the section dealing with Respondent’s computer policy),1 he did not know “tracking software” included concealed webcams that could covertly take and send
photographs of him. (R. at 9).
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taken the pictures of Peters’s home and discovered that he was gay, Respondent terminated Peters, purportedly due to his “poor job performance.” (R. at 7).
Perplexed, Peters requested a copy of his employee file pursuant to
section 3.5 of the Employee Handbook. (R. at 7; see also R. at 14, app. A).
Included in the report was a file called “Stolen/Lost Laptop Report” that
described in detail the recent missing-laptop incident as well as the pictures taken of him while working from his home office. (R. at 7). After
inquiring about the report, Peters discovered, for the first time, the Lost
& Found® technology. (R. at 7).
With knowledge of the information that Respondent had procured
via the photographs taken inside of his home, Peters demanded an investigation into his termination; he claimed that he was not fired because of
the Event in Petersville but because Respondent discovered that he was
gay. (R. at 7). Respondent, however, refused to investigate the matter,
claiming that it did not need a reason to fire Peters because he was an atwill employee. (R. at 7).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
In 2011, Peters sued Respondent for (1) intrusion upon seclusion and
(2) violation of the Marshall Human Rights Act for Respondent’s discriminatory conduct in terminating Peters’s employment. (R. at 8). Respondent filed motions for summary judgment on both counts, which the
Marshall County Circuit Court granted in their entirety. (R. at 3, 8).
The First District Court of Appeals for the State of Marshall affirmed the
Circuit Court’s Order, and this Court granted Peters’s leave to appeal.
(R. at 2, 13).

The First District Court of Appeals wrongfully affirmed the Order of
the Marshall County Circuit Court granting Respondent’s motions for
summary judgment, as Peters has established a prima facie case on both
of his claims, or alternatively, has raised genuine issues of material fact
with respect to each claim.
PART I

C M
Y K
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Respondent intentionally intruded upon Peters’s seclusion in a
highly offensive manner. Respondent installed a software program
called Lost & Found® on all of its employees’ mobile devices with the
specific intent to activate the technology and pry upon the devices’ unsuspecting users. Although Respondent may urge that its desire was to
catch persons who wrongfully obtained its property, it is clear that Respondent’s policy also contemplates surreptitious surveillance of those

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 99 Side B

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 100 Side A

10/02/2013 12:46:52

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\29-4\SFT406.txt

2012]

unknown

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

Seq: 7

9-SEP-13

8:44

707

10/02/2013 12:46:52

C M
Y K

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 100 Side A

who innocently recover the property—whether that person be a random
finder or a company employee, like Peters.
Furthermore, even if Respondent did not desire to take covert photographs of Peters while inside of his home, it knew with substantial certainty that such result was likely to occur. Indeed, notwithstanding the
predictable situation in which an employee would misplace his mobile
device coupled with the even-more-certain situation in which the same
employee would subsequently recover his device (evidenced by Respondent’s policy regarding employees’ obligation to report recovered devices), Respondent failed entirely to warn its employees that they were
subject to Respondent’s observation any time they used their companyissued electronic devices.
Clearly, Respondent’s intent to intrude upon Peters’s seclusion is
unaffected by any consideration of harbored malice. For, malice is not,
nor has it ever been, an element of intent. Though Respondent succeeded in confusing the issues of intent and intrusion for the courts below, the two elements are distinct, e.g., there can be no intrusion, even if
the conduct was intentional, when the intruder has the other person’s
permission or consent, but even when the intruder acts under the belief
(accurate or not) that he has such permission, which could negate the
presence of malice, his intrusion remains intentional. Even if this Court
were able to follow Respondent’s misplaced logic, Respondent has only
established one thing: there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to its belief.
Additionally, Peters has established that Respondent actually intruded upon his solitude, seclusion, and private affairs or concerns when
it took photographs of him without his knowledge or consent inside of his
home—the most sacred and private place in which no employer has the
right to be. Indeed, given the sanctity of Peters’s home, Respondent’s
intrusion would undoubtedly offend the sensibilities of any person, reasonable or otherwise. That no sexual or intimate conduct was captured
on the photographs does not assuage this conclusion because it is not the
information procured that gives rise to liability, it is the nature and circumstances in which the information was procured. Covert surveillance
inside the confines of a person’s home is per se highly offensive.
Finally, there is no plausible excuse that could ever justify an employer crossing the threshold of an employee’s private home without the
employee’s knowledge or consent. In light of the fundamental right and
personal autonomy involved in this case, it is appropriate for this Court
to consider the other reasonably available, less-intrusive means that Respondent could have used to obtain its desired end. For example, if Respondent had merely included a sentence regarding the Lost & Found®
technology in its Employee Handbook, it would have vitiated any chance
that an employee would be photographed without his knowledge. In
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sum, it is clear that Respondent intentionally intruded upon Peters’s seclusion in a way that was highly offensive and without reasonable justification; therefore, Peters respectfully requests this Court to reverse the
First District Court of Appeals’s decision and remand this case for trial.
PART II

10/02/2013 12:46:52
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Y K
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Respondent patently violated the Marshall Human Rights Act when
it fired Peters after it wrongfully uncovered and exposed Peters’s sexual
orientation. Contrary to Respondent’s misguided belief, Peters’s status
as an at-will employee did not grant Respondent a license to blatantly
discriminate against him. Therefore, Respondent should be held liable
for its actions against Peters in violation of the Marshall Human Rights
Act.
To be clear, Peters has presented sufficient direct evidence linking
Respondent’s discriminatory animus to his termination. Specifically, the
individual who both owned Respondent and served as the face of the
company, Duffy O’Plenty, publicly hailed derogatory slurs toward homosexuals, including statements that “[h]omosexuality is a sin against God”
and that it is “detrimental and ultimately destructive to the foundations
of our society,” demonstrating Respondent’s official anti-gay sentiments.
This evidence, coupled with the other evidence of discrimination
presented by Peters, is clearly sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that Respondent was motivated by an illegitimate criteria in firing Peters—its disdain for homosexuals.
Additionally, Peters’s discrimination claim satisfies the standard set
forth in McDonnell Douglas, as Peters, a gay man, clearly falls within
the protections afforded by the Marshall Human Rights Act. Further,
Peters was terminated despite ten years of employment and a near-perfect record. Indeed, the only blemish in Peters’s file—besides his sexual
orientation, which Respondent apparently perceives as a “blemish”—is
the 2010 Event in Petersville. This Event, however, was not only predictable (based on Respondent’s piling on of additional responsibilities),
but it was reasonably excusable due to Peters’s distraught emotional
state brought on by the death of his beloved dog. While a rational employer would likely treat a corporate veteran like Peters with respect,
Respondent used the situation as an excuse to rid itself of a homosexual
employee.
Consequently, even if this Court accepts Respondent’s excuse as “legitimate,” Peters has sufficiently established that Respondent’s excuse
was manufactured in an attempt to avoid liability for its discriminatory
conduct. There have been at least two separate occasions where Respondent was lenient in response to its heterosexual supervisors’ analogous
(or worse) mistakes against the company. For example, notwithstanding
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Respondent’s extreme efforts to preserve its proprietary information, it
merely transferred a heterosexual supervisor who leaked such information. Further, in response to another heterosexual supervisor’s blatant
sexual discrimination, which subjected the company to multiple complaints, it barely administered a slap on the wrist. Therefore, in light of
Respondent’s history of leniency with respect to discrimination as well as
its preferential treatment toward heterosexual employees, it is clear that
Respondent’s proffered reason for firing Peters was mere pretext to its
discrimination against him. Accordingly, Peters respectfully requests
this Court to reverse the First District Court of Appeals’s decision and
remand this case for trial.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is a procedural tool that allows a court to dispose of all or part of a case prior to trial, but summary judgment is only
appropriate when the moving party establishes that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Smith v. Jasper, 15 Marsh. 29 (2000); MARSHALL R. CIV. P. 56(c)
(2012). On appeal, an appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo and applies the same standard as the trial court. Id. In
doing so, “the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 150 (2000) (citing Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545,
554–555 (1990)).
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

C M
Y K

10/02/2013 12:46:52

The Restatement (Second) of Torts, which has been adopted by the
appellate court below as well as the majority of courts in the United
States, provides that “[o]ne who invades the right of privacy of another is
subject to liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977); see, e.g., Koeppel v.
Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177 (Iowa 2011); Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d
512 (Tex. 1993); Mauri v. Smith, 929 P.2d 307 (Or. 1996); Lake v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998). According to the Restatement, an invasion of privacy occurs when one “intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another
or his private affairs or concerns” in a way that is “highly offensive to a
reasonable person.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977)

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 101 Side A

RESPONDENT’S SURREPTITIOUS SURVEILLANCE OF PETERS INSIDE OF HIS
HOME AND WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT AMOUNTS TO AN
INTENTIONAL INTRUSION UPON PETERS’S SECLUSION FOR WHICH PETERS
IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER.
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(setting forth the elements of the cause of action known as “intrusion
upon seclusion”).
Therefore, to prevail on a claim for intrusion upon seclusion, Peters
was merely required to establish the following three elements: (1) Respondent intended to intrude, physically or otherwise, (2) upon Peters’s
solitude, seclusion, or private affairs or concerns (3) in a way that would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person. See id. Contrary to both the
trial court and the First District Court of Appeals’s position below, Peters has sufficiently established the foregoing elements and should
therefore be afforded his just relief, or at a minimum, Peters should be
granted the right to proceed to trial. Accordingly, Peters respectfully
asks this Court to reverse the First District Court of Appeals’s decision
and remand this case to the trial court.
Respondent intentionally intruded upon Peters’s seclusion because it
installed its Lost & Found® technology on his computer with the
specific desire to intrude upon the seclusion of its unsuspecting users,
or alternatively, Respondent was substantially certain that such
intrusion was likely to occur

C M
Y K

10/02/2013 12:46:52

2. Surely, this principle is so engraved in our legal system that it undoubtedly
prompts flashbacks to the first-year torts classroom and the infamous “chair case,” wherein
the court held that “[t]he mere absence of any intent to injure the plaintiff or to play a
prank on her or to embarrass her, or to commit an assault and battery on her would not
absolve [Defendant] from liability” so long as he knew or was substantially certain that
“that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the chair had been.” Garratt v. Dailey,
279 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Wash. 1955).
3. See Daniel P. O’Gorman, Looking Out for Your Employees: Employers’ Surreptitious Physical Surveillance of Employees and the Tort of Invasion of Privacy, 85 NEB. L.
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The threshold question in an intrusion-upon-seclusion action, as is
the case with any intentional tort, is whether the intrusion was “intentional.” The Restatement defines “intent” to “denote that the actor
desires to cause [the] consequences of his act, or that he believes that the
consequences are substantially certain to result from it.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1977). To be clear, the presence or absence of
malice is not an element. A defendant cannot escape liability for an intentional invasion of a plaintiff’s privacy by claiming that he wished no
harm or embarrassment upon the plaintiff as a result of wrongfully exposing the plaintiff to the public.2 “The intent with which tort liability is
concerned is . . . an intent to bring about a result which will invade the
interests of another in a way that the law forbids.” W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (5th ed. 1984)
(emphasis added).
Courts rarely address the element of intent when adjudicating
claims for the intrusion upon the seclusion of another.3 This is likely
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true because courts generally have little difficulty in finding a defendant’s invasive conduct to be “intentional.” In this case, however, both
the trial court and the appellate court have somehow managed to find
such difficulty, which has led to unmistakable error at each level of this
controversy. First, the courts below have wholly ignored the basic nature of Respondent’s Lost & Found® technology; Respondent installed
the software on its employees’ computers for the specific purpose of prying into the lives of unsuspecting subjects. Second, the lower courts have
confused malice with intent, resulting in the imposition of an unfounded
element to the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.
Respondent desired to cause the consequences of its actions in
implementing the Lost & Found® technology: to invade the privacy of
both the “thief” and the “finder”—in this case, its own employee, Peters.

C M
Y K
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REV. 212, 233–34 (2006) (“Rarely is intent (or lack of it) an issue in cases involving an
employer’s surreptitious physical surveillance of employees. Usually, the employer intends
to conduct the surveillance and intends to learn whether the employee is engaging in the
very activity that is ultimately viewed during the surveillance.”).
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Before this Court can conduct a thorough and accurate analysis of
this case, this Court, unlike the courts below, should acknowledge the
true nature of Respondent’s Lost & Found® technology. To be clear, this
unfortunate yet undeniable situation stems from Respondent’s fear that
its electronic devices, or the information thereon, would be lost or stolen.
(See R. at 5). In an effort to mitigate this risk, Respondent purchased the
Lost & Found® technology and directed its IT department to install it on
all electronic, mobile devices. (R. at 5). The Lost & Found® technology
is specifically designed to surreptitiously take photographs of both the
user of the device and the device’s screen by using a concealed camera.
(R. at 5).
Clearly, it cannot be said that the drastic, costly act of installing
such software was the result of inadvertence or mistake. Rather, Respondent intentionally installed the software and was therefore fully
aware of its capabilities. In that vein, it is important to note that once
activated, the software does not differentiate between users, i.e., it captures the activities of any unsuspecting individual who is unfortunate
enough to use the device. Despite Respondent’s knowledge of this fact,
however, it failed to inform its employees that it could, at any time, trigger the software and thereby subject them to unwanted observation.
In addition to recognizing the true nature of Respondent’s Lost &
Found® technology, it is important to understand Respondent’s policy
with respect to the technology. Per Respondent’s direction, its employees
were required to report any missing electronic device, regardless of
whether the device was (1) lost or (2) stolen. (R. at 9). Although not
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immediately intuitive, this distinction—lost versus stolen—is crucial because it reveals that Respondent not only intended to photograph the
“thief” but also the “finder” of the missing device. For example, in the
normal case of stolen property, once an employee has reported the device
missing, Respondent will activate the embedded webcam to catch the
thief in the act. However, in the also-normal case of misplaced property,
Respondent will immediately trigger the Lost & Found® technology in
the exact same manner, inevitably capturing the finder of the device—
whether that finder be an innocent bystander or a company employee.
From the above-stated examples, it is clear that Respondent implemented the Lost & Found® technology with the specific intent to capture
the activities of, i.e., intrude upon, both the thief and the finder. Surely,
in these situations (depending on the circumstances), a court may not
always find the intrusion to be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
thereby satisfying a claim for intrusion upon seclusion. However, in
every situation, a court must find that the intrusion was intentional.
Therefore, regardless of Respondent’s primary objective in installing the
Lost & Found® technology, it undeniably had the intent to intrude upon
the seclusion of any individual who used the device after it had been
reported missing. Here, the unfortunate and unsuspecting individual
who used the device was Respondent’s own employee, Peters. Therefore,
Respondent intentionally intruded upon Peters’s seclusion.
Pursuant to Respondent’s Lost & Found® policy, Respondent knew
with substantial certainty that any employee who recovered its lost or
stolen property would unknowingly fall victim to its spyware
technology.
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Even if this Court finds that Respondent did not specifically desire
to intrude upon Peters’s seclusion, it should still find that Respondent
was substantially certain that Peters’s seclusion would be invaded by its
Lost & Found® technology. With the influx of new technology and an
increasing telecommuting workforce, Respondent decided to tap into the
mobile workforce, and thereby Respondent assumed the correlative risk
of stolen and lost equipment. To combat this foreseeable risk, Respondent implemented its Lost & Found® policy, aimed at recovering both
stolen and lost property. Therefore, to say that its ‘property was likely to
be misplaced’ is quite the understatement. At a minimum, there was a
substantial certainty that Respondent’s employees would misplace its
property. Likewise, there was also a substantial certainty that the same
employees who misplaced their property would subsequently find their
property. Further, this certainty is demonstrated by Respondent’s own
employee handbook, which provides in relevant part that an “[e]mployee
must report if company issued electronic equipment has been recovered.”
(R. at 14). If Respondent was so certain that its employees would inevi-
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tably recover its missing devices as to create a policy for that very situation, it reasonably follows that Respondent was substantially certain
that its employees would be caught in the line of fire by its Lost &
Found® technology.
On appeal, Respondent argued that it did not intend to record Peters
because its IT department did not receive Peters’s voicemail until four
hours, and approximately fifty photographs, after Peters reported that
his laptop had been recovered; it stated that “it was accidental that the
camera recorded Peters for as long as it did.” (R. at 10). Assuming, without conceding, that it was negligent, as opposed to intentional, that Respondent failed to terminate the surveillance of the laptop after it was
informed that the laptop was in Peters’s possession, the result would not
change. For, it was Respondent’s policy (or lack thereof) that gave rise to
the substantial certainty that it would wrongfully procure private photographs of Peters in his home.
As indicated above, despite the near-certain possibility that an employee–finder would be captured by the embedded webcam as well as the
fact that Respondent neither warned nor implemented a policy to protect
against unknowing employee surveillance, its intentional act of installing the Lost & Found® technology produced a substantial certainty that
an employee—Peters—would be subject to privacy invasion via surreptitious surveillance. Therefore, it is clear that Respondent intentionally
intruded upon Peters’s seclusion.

C M
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The conclusion that Respondent had the requisite intent to intrude
upon Peters’s seclusion is supported by the long-standing principle that
malice is not an element of intent. See Ali v. Douglas Cable Commc’ns,
929 F. Supp. 1362, 1382 (D. Kan. 1996) (citing Froelich v. Adair, 516
P.2d 993, 997 (Kan. 1973) (“The precise motives for invasion of privacy
are unimportant. Defendant’s action, rather than precise motives accompanying the act or conduct, is the criterion of liability.”)); see also Daniel
P. O’Gorman, supra note 3, at 233–35 (“The intent with which tort liability is concerned is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do any
harm. Rather it is an intent to bring about a result which will invade the
interests of another in a way that the law forbids.”).
Notwithstanding this basic principle, Respondent was somehow successful in its attempt to muddle the waters for the courts below by infusing the element of intent with that of intrusion. The practical effect of
this confusion has created a giant loophole for Respondent to slip

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 103 Side A

The court below wrongfully confused the element of intent by imposing
an unprecedented element of malice: Respondent’s belief (even if true)
that Peters consented to being observed inside of his home cannot
negate its intent to intrude upon Peters’s seclusion.
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through because only under Respondent’s purported standard, could it
argue that it lacked intent due to the fact that it did not maliciously
intrude upon Peters’s seclusion. Fortunately, this Court has the opportunity to set the record straight by applying the true standard—a standard that does not consider the presence or absence of malice.
Respondent’s argument, which the courts below wrongfully adopted,
is based on a 1989 Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision, O’Donnell v.
United States, 891 F.2d 1079 (3d Cir. 1989). The essence of Respondent’s
argument was that it lacked intent because it believed that it had the
“necessary personal permission or legal authority” to record Peters while
he was inside of his home. (R. at 9). Because, in making this argument,
Respondent relies so heavily on O’Donnell, it is important to consider the
context in which that case was decided.
In O’Donnell, Thomas O’Donnell, a veteran who suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder, worked for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a disabled veterans employment representative in its
Hatboro office. Id. at 1081. Because of his disorder, O’Donnell requested
a transfer to a different office. Id. In response, his supervisor told him to
provide a statement from a Veterans Administration (“VA”) psychiatrist
to verify his need to transfer. Id. O’Donnell executed a consent form to
release his information, but he failed to specify the exact information
that could be disclosed. Id. O’Donnell’s psychiatrist wrote two letters to
his supervisor corroborating his need to transfer; however, a VA employee subsequently sent O’Donnell’s supervisor his treatment summary
containing additional, private information that was not pertinent to his
transfer. Id.
O’Donnell sued the VA for invasion of privacy, and the VA argued
that O’Donnell impliedly consented to the release of his information
when he signed the consent form. Id. at 1081–83. In analyzing
O’Donnell’s claim, the Third Circuit expressly recognized the Restatement’s definition of “intent.” Id. at 1083 (“the actor desires to cause the
consequences of his act, or . . . believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it”). The court went on to note that although the Restatement provides a clear definition of “intent,” it does not
define “intrusion.” Id.
After considering the dictionary definition of the term “intrude” as
well as the comments to section 652B of the Restatement, the court
stated that “an ‘intrusion upon seclusion’ claim usually involves a defendant who does not believe that he has either the necessary personal permission or legal authority to do the intrusive act.” Id. Thus, the court
concluded that “an actor commits an intentional intrusion only if he believes, or is substantially certain, that he lacks the necessary legal or
personal permission to commit the intrusive act.” Id. As a result, the
court held that “the VA believed it had O’Donnell’s permission to release
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the disputed record” and that because “O’Donnell offered no evidence to
the contrary,” the VA did not intentionally intrude upon O’Donnell’s seclusion. Id.
This case is distinguishable from O’Donnell in two major respects.
First, in O’Donnell, there was no question as to whether the VA intentionally disclosed O’Donnell’s records. Clearly, the VA employee specifically intended to send O’Donnell’s treatment summary to his supervisor
(albeit, under the false impression that O’Donnell had consented). See
id. at 1081. In fact, the VA did not even attempt to challenge this fact on
appeal; its only claim was that it thought O’Donnell had consented to the
disclosure. Furthermore, the court’s analysis rested on the definition of
“intrude.” Id. at 1083 (“Webster’s defines ‘intrude’ to mean to thrust oneself in without invitation, permission, or welcome.”). Therefore, despite
the court’s unfortunate choice of language, the actual issue before the
court was whether there was an “intrusion” under the Restatement—not
whether such intrusion was intentional.
Hence, a careful reading of O’Donnell reveals that the element of
intent does not rest upon the defendant’s belief that his acts were wrong,
i.e., malicious, but rather, whether he either desired to cause the consequences of his action or was substantially certain that such consequences
were likely to result. Indeed, if malice were tied to the element of intent,
it would lead to an absurd result. Specifically, if malice were an element,
as long as one believed that his actions were non-tortious, he would escape liability. Setting aside the evidentiary concerns in proving (or disproving) such state of mind, this would reward ignorance of the law.
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Section 2.6 – Company reserves the right to initiate and activate tracking software in order to track lost or stolen any type of company issued
electronic equipment.
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The second distinguishing factor from O’Donnell is that unlike Mr.
O’Donnell, Peters has provided sufficient proof to raise a question of material fact with respect to Respondent’s claim that Peters consented to
Respondent’s observation of him inside of his home. Whereas O’Donnell
gave express consent, which was not limited to a particular type of information, Peters never consented, expressly or impliedly, to being observed
by Respondent from inside of his home. See id. at 1081. Furthermore,
even if this Court decides that Peters has not disproved his consent as a
matter of law, Peters has at least raised a question of material fact with
respect to whether or not he consented.
Even a cursory look at Respondent’s Employee Handbook proves
that Peters was never put on notice, nor did he consent, to the fact that
Respondent could secretly procure photographs of him using his company-issued laptop. (See R. at 14). The relevant provision of the handbook reads as follows:
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(R. at 14) (emphasis added). It can hardly be said that a reasonable
person (or any person for that matter) would consider the term “tracking
software” to include covert surveillance using an embedded webcam. In
fact, the appellate court even agreed that Respondent’s policy was “vague
at best.” (R. at 9). Therefore, even assuming, without conceding, that
Respondent’s intent was tied to its belief that it had permission to photograph Peters in his home, Respondent’s argument would fail because it
has not established that Peters consented to being photographed as a
matter of law. At the very least, this would present a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to Respondent’s true belief.
Respondent intruded upon Peters’s solitude, seclusion, and private
affairs or concerns by covertly taking photographs of Peters and thereby
placing itself inside of Peters’s home.
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Clearly, there is no better example of an intrusion than photographing an individual in the safety of his home and without his knowledge.
Peters had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy inside of his
home, and Respondent invaded that privacy, thereby intruding upon his
seclusion. Indeed, with respect to the fundamental protections afforded
by the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court has drawn “a firm
line at the entrance of the house.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40
(2001) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) and recognizing the absolute protection one enjoys inside of his home, regardless of
how slight the compromise of privacy may be).
A measure of personal isolation and personal control over the conditions of privacy’s abandonment is of the very essence of personal freedom
and dignity, is part of what our culture means by these concepts. A man
whose home may be entered at the will of another, whose conversations
may be overheard at the will of another, whose marital and familial intimacies may be overseen at the will of another, is less of a man, has less
human dignity, on that account. Koeppel, 808 N.W.2d at 180 (quoting
Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer
to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 973–74 (1964)).
Moreover, “[t]he tort of intrusion upon the plaintiff’s solitude or seclusion is not limited to a physical invasion of his home” but extends to
other forms of sensory invasion, e.g., photography. Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 242 (N.H. 1964) (“Whether actual or potential such
‘publicity with respect to private matters of purely personal concern is an
injury to personality. It impairs the mental peace and comfort of the individual and may produce suffering more acute than that produced by a
mere bodily injury.”). Additionally, an individual enjoys such protection
regardless of whether he shares the residence with another or routinely
invites others into his home—”visibility to some people does not strip
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him of the right to remain secluded from others.” Stessman v. Am. Black
Hawk Broad. Co., 416 N.W.2d 685, 688 (Iowa 1987) (quoting Huskey v.
Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 632 F.Supp. 1282, 1287–88 (N.D. Ill. 1986)). Consequently, although Respondent did not physically place itself inside of
Peters’s home, it nevertheless compromised his reasonable expectation of
privacy, and therefore, Peters has satisfied his burden in establishing
that Respondent intruded upon his seclusion.
Respondent’s intrusion upon the solitude and seclusion of Peter’s home,
without his knowledge or consent, would most certainty offend the
ordinary sensibilities of any reasonable person, and therefore, because
Respondent has no legitimate excuse for invading Peters’s reasonable
expectation of privacy, its intrusion upon Peters’s seclusion was highly
offensive to a reasonable person.
The third element of an intrusion-upon-seclusion claim is that the
intrusion occurred in a way that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). Having
established that Respondent intentionally intruded upon Peters’s seclusion, Peters respectfully submits that, contrary to the appellate court’s
position below, Respondent’s intrusion was highly offensive. (See R. at
10); see also Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)
(“[T]he installation of the hidden viewing devices alone constitutes an
interference with that privacy which a reasonable person would find
highly offensive.”).
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For some reason, the court of appeals only addressed this element in
a comment inserted after its holding, which stated that “we find the recording not to be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” (R. at 10).
The purported reasoning behind this position was that the webcam “did
not capture [Peters] doing anything other than working.” (R. at 10). The
court’s conclusory statement is flawed for two reasons. First, it ignores
entirely the sanctity of the home. And second, the content of the photographs are irrelevant for purposes of this tort—it is sufficient that Respondent recorded Peters in the privacy of his home without his
knowledge or consent. See In re Marriage of Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824,
829–30 (Iowa 2008) (“The wrongfulness of the conduct springs not from
the specific nature of the recorded activities, but instead from the fact
that [the plaintiff’s] activities were recorded without her knowledge and
consent at a time and place and under circumstances in which she had a
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In light of the sacred protection that Peters’s should be afforded within
the confines of his home, it is clear that Respondent’s intrusion into the
safety of Peters’s home, without his knowledge or consent, would be
highly offensive to any reasonable person.
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reasonable expectation of privacy.”); Koeppel v. Speirs, 779 N.W.2d 494,
at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010) aff’d, 808 N.W.2d 177 (Iowa 2011) (“[I]t is
sufficient that the seclusion of the . . . private area[ ] was intruded upon,”
regardless of the quality or content of the images received).
Indeed, the element of intrusion does not hinge on the specific information or content procured. Rather, a person intrudes upon another’s
seclusion when he penetrates the other’s objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. See Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1072
(Cal. 2009). Hernandez, discussed further below, demonstrates this principle. In Hernandez, the California Supreme Court held that the mere
installation of a device capable of recording an employee in the workplace, without her knowledge or consent, was sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of intrusion. Id. at 1074 (“[W]hile privacy expectations
may be significantly diminished in the workplace, they are not lacking
altogether.”). The Hernandez court’s conclusion was unaffected by the
defendants’ argument that the recording device never recorded the employee. Id.
The case at hand is also analogous to an Iowa Supreme Court case,
In re Marriage of Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824. In Tigges, the plaintiff’s husband, Jeffery Tigges, installed several electronic recording devices in the
couple’s bedroom to record the plaintiff’s activities. Id. at 825. When the
plaintiff witnessed Jeffery removing a cassette from a recording device,
she discovered that she was being video taped, and in connection with a
subsequent divorce proceeding, she alleged that Jeffery had invaded her
privacy by intruding upon her seclusion. Id. In response, Jeffery
claimed that the intrusion was not highly offensive because “the videotape captured nothing of a ‘private’ or ‘sexual’ nature.” Id. at 829. The
Iowa Supreme Court held that Jeffery’s “contention [was] without
merit . . . because the content of the videotape is not determinative of the
question of whether Jeffrey tortiously invaded [the plaintiff’s] privacy.”
Id. at 830. Instead, the court concluded that the wrongfulness of the conduct arose from the “specific nature of the recorded activities,” i.e., the
recording of activities within the home. Id.
To be clear, Tigges demonstrates two relevant key facts. First, every
individual—including Peters—is entitled “to be left alone, to live a life of
seclusion, [and] to be free of unwarranted publicity.” Id. at 829 (quoting
Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publ’g Co., 76 N.W.2d 762, 764–65 (Iowa
1956). Thus, any device that records intimate, private conduct within
the confines of a person’s home is per se highly offensive because it compromises the person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Accordingly,
the fact that Respondent took photographs of Peters inside of his home
and without his knowledge or consent is, by itself, highly offensive.
Second, Tigges reveals that liability for intrusion upon seclusion
stems from the act itself, not from the specific information that was
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wrongfully procured. Therefore, Respondent’s argument that it only exposed images of Peters at his desk4 (as opposed to other graphic images
that could have been captured) is entirely irrelevant to the offensive nature of the act itself. See Koeppel, 779 N.W.2d at *6 (“[T]he camera need
[not] be pointed at the toilet—it is sufficient that the seclusion of the
bathroom, a private area, was intruded upon.”). Notwithstanding the
upsetting thought of what could have been captured by Respondent’s
Lost & Found® technology, conducting covert surveillance inside Peters’s home, regardless of the specific area within his home, would undeniably offend the ordinary sensibilities of any reasonable person. In light
of this, Peters respectfully urges this Court to hold that Respondent’s
conduct was highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Although no employer’s intrusion into its employee’s home, without the
employee’s knowledge or consent, is ever justified, Respondent’s
purported reason for doing so—to recover a used laptop using spyware
technology—is without merit, and thus, its intrusion upon Peters’s
seclusion remains highly offensive.
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4. It is important to note that although the court of appeals concluded that Respondent’s camera “did not capture [Peters] doing anything other than working,” the camera
actually captured several personal items that belonged to Peters, including (1) private photographs of him and his partner engaged in kissing, embracing, and performing a “commitment” ceremony; (2) photographs of Peters with a prominent gay-rights activist; and (3)
personal household items, including rainbow colored flags symbolizing Peters’s sexual orientation. (See R. at 6).
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Even when a plaintiff, like Peters, has established that a defendant
intentionally intruded upon his seclusion in a way that was highly offensive, some courts still perform a balancing test to determine the level of
offensiveness. See Daniel P. O’Gorman, supra note 3, at 262 (“[M]ost
courts determine whether the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person by balancing ‘the employer’s interest in intruding and
the employee’s privacy interest.’ ”); Parish Nat’l Bank v. Lane, 397 So. 2d
1282, 1286 (La. 1981) (stating that “an actionable invasion of privacy
exists only when the defendant’s conduct is unreasonable and seriously
interferes with the plaintiff’s privacy interest” and that “[t]he reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct is assessed by balancing his interest
in pursuing his course of conduct against the plaintiff’s interest in protecting his privacy.”) (citations omitted). Therefore, although no plausible excuse could ever justify Respondent’s placing itself inside Peters’s
home without his knowledge or consent, in an abundance of caution, Peters will address the issue here.
Although it is likely that Respondent will assert what it believes to
be a “legitimate reason” for photographing Peters in his home, Respondent’s proffered excuse must fail. For, this is not an instance of monitor-
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5. Id. It is important to note that Hillsides did not suspect Lopez because the misuse
occurred at night after Lopez had left the office. Id. at 1069.
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ing employees in the workplace, nor is this an instance of monitoring
employees’ public behavior after working hours; here, Respondent monitored Peters inside of his home—an area that not even a truly legitimate
business reason could justify intruding upon. Accordingly, it is clear that
Peters has established a prima facie case that Respondent not only intentionally intruded upon his seclusion but that Respondent’s intrusion
was unjustified and thus, highly offensive.
The California Supreme Court has recently applied this balancing
test in the context of employee surveillance. See Hernandez, 211 P.3d
1063. In Hernandez, Hillsides Children Center, Inc. (“Hillsides”), a residential treatment center for abused children, was looking into instances
of computer misuse. Id. at 1068. According to its computer specialist,
someone was accessing pornographic materials using the plaintiff Maria–Jose Lopez’s computer.5 Hillsides was especially concerned because
in addition to the fact that downloading pornographic materials was
against its “E–Mail, Voicemail and Computer Systems Policy,” it suspected the culprit to be one of its program directors who worked with the
children, many of whom had been abused by exposure to and participation in pornography. Id. at 1067–69.
In response to its suspicions, Hillsides set up a video camera system
inside Lopez’s office, but because Hillsides suspected an employee of the
misuse, it did not tell Lopez about the system in fear that word of its plan
would spread. Id. at 1069. Although the camera would activate any
time there was movement in the room, in order for an image to display
on the system’s monitor or for a recording to be made, Hillsides had to
plug a wireless device into the monitor. Id. It was undisputed that Hillsides never activated the recording device while Lopez was in her office,
and Lopez was never caught on the camera. Id. at 1070.
Approximately three weeks after Hillsides had installed the camera,
Lopez discovered it. Id. In shock, Lopez reported the camera to her supervisor and subsequently sued Hillsides for invasion of privacy. Id. at
1067, 1070. The trial court dismissed Lopez’s invasion of privacy claim
on summary judgment, but the court of appeals reversed and found that
Hillsides’s intrusion was highly offensive. Id. at 1071. After a lengthy
analysis of California law regarding intrusion upon seclusion, the California Supreme Court held that Hillsides intentionally intruded upon
Lopez’s privacy but because of its justifications for doing so, the intrusion
was not highly offensive. Id. at 1072–82.
The Hernandez court’s analysis of the balancing test is particularly
useful in this case. As indicated above, the court had no issue with determining that Hillsides’s covert surveillance, regardless of the information
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it procured, was a clear intrusion upon Lopez’s seclusion. Id. at 1074–78.
As the court noted, however, a plaintiff must also show that the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Id. at 1078 (citing
Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200 (Cal. 1998)). The court
set forth the standard and stated that it must examine[ ] all of the surrounding circumstances, including the ‘degree and setting’ of the intrusion and ‘the intruder’s ‘motives and objectives.’’ . . . [It] also may be
asked to decide whether the plaintiff, in attempting to defeat a claim of
competing interests, has shown that the defendant could have minimized
the privacy intrusion through other reasonably available, less intrusive
means. Id. at 1079 (citing Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 236, Miller v. Nat’l
Broad. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1483–84 (1986), and Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 38 (1994)).
Considering the degree and setting of the surveillance, the Hernandez court found that (1) Hillsides “took a measured approach” in conducting the operation, (2) its efforts were “largely confined,” and (3) it
“kept abreast of [its] own monitoring activities, and did not expose plaintiff[ ] to the risk of covert visual monitoring or video recording any longer
than was necessary.” Id. With respect to Hillsides’s justification, the
court held that Hillsides was motivated by a legitimate concern in protecting the “wholesome environment for the abused children” and avoiding “any exposure that might aggravate their vulnerable state[s].” Id. at
1081. Further, because it was a situation involving decreased expectations of privacy—the workplace—the court refused to force Hillsides to
justify its actions against the least offensive alternative. Id. at 1082 (citing Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 50); see also id. at 1073 (“[E]xcept in the rare case
in which a ‘fundamental’ right of personal autonomy is involved—the defendant need not present a ‘compelling’ countervailing interest; only
‘general balancing tests are employed.’ ”).
Clearly, the case at hand is distinguishable from Hernandez in that
(1) it does not involve a situation with a diminished expectation of privacy, but one in which a “fundamental right of personal autonomy is involved”—Peters’s home—and (2) in light of the heightened privacy
concerns and the more reasonable, less-intrusive alternatives, Respondent’s conduct was egregious and highly offensive. Indeed, Respondent
was not faced with the decision that Hillsides faced in Hernandez, i.e.,
either (a) inform the employee with the risk of compromising the entire
plan or (b) do not inform the employee and take steps to ensure she is not
recorded.
There is no plausible explanation for failing to give Peters notice
that his laptop was bugged with a hidden camera. Therefore, even assuming, without conceding, that Respondent’s motive for implementing
the Lost & Foud® technology was legitimate, its methods in doing so—
covertly and without Peters’s consent—cannot justify the type of intru-
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sion that occurred. Consequently, Respondent intruded upon Peters’s seclusion in a way that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
and thus, Peters is entitled to his just relief. Accordingly, Peters respectfully requests this Court to reverse the First District Court of Appeals’s
decision and remand this case for trial.
RESPONDENT MALICIOUSLY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST PETERS IN VIOLATION
MARSHALL HUMAN RIGHTS ACT WHEN IT TERMINATED PETERS ON
THE BASIS OF HIS SEXUAL ORIENTATION.

OF THE

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 107 Side B

It is truly astonishing that notwithstanding our nation’s extensive
history and heinous experience with discrimination, some citizens remain inclined to persecute individuals based on their minority status.
Indeed, this case demonstrates such travesty in that Peters—a gay man
who zealously yet unsuccessfully tried to set his personal dispositions
aside in order to hold a job equal to that of a heterosexual—was fired
directly after his employer, Respondent, discovered his sexual orientation. As with any form of discrimination, discrimination based on sexual
orientation, like Respondent’s conduct at issue here, cannot stand. To be
clear, Peters has established every necessary element to prove discrimination and is therefore entitled to his just relief, or at the very least, he is
entitled to present his case at trial.
It has been argued that because Peters was an “at-will” employee,
Respondent owed him no explanation of the rationale that drove its decision to terminate his employment. (See R. at 11–12 (“[A]n employer may
ordinarily discharge an [at-will] employee for good cause, for no cause, or
for a cause that some might view as morally indefensible.” (citing Miracle v. Bell Cnty. Emergency Med. Servs., 237 S.W.3d 555, 558 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2007)))). However, this argument is incomplete because no court
would hold that an at-will status grants an employer the categorical
right to discriminate. See Miracle, 237 S.W.3d at 558 (holding that an
employee has a cause of action when the wrongful discharge is contrary
to public policy as evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision);
Talley v. Wash. Inventory Serv., 37 F.3d 310, 311 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Illinois
also recognizes an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine and allows an employee to sue in tort where termination from employment violates a public policy.”). Accordingly, Respondent must answer for its
discriminatory conduct in firing Peters because it terminated him in violation of the public policy established in the Marshall Human Rights Act
(“MHRA”), discussed further below. (See R. at 15, app. B).

10/02/2013 12:46:52

C M
Y K

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 108 Side A

10/02/2013 12:46:52

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\29-4\SFT406.txt

2012]

unknown

Seq: 23

9-SEP-13

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

8:44

723

In light of the circumstances leading to Peters’s termination, there is
both direct and indirect evidence of Respondent’s discriminatory
animus sufficient to support a finding that Respondent’s decision to
terminate Peters was motivated by an impermissible criteria—Peters’s
sexual orientation.

Same sex marriage is unnatural. Homosexuality is a sin against God.
It is unnatural and detrimental and ultimately destructive to the foundations of our society. (R. at 4).
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Not only did Mr. O’Plenty’s statement clearly convey his own personal feelings against homosexuals, but coming from the individual who
served as the face of the company, it openly declared Respondent’s offi-
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As a threshold matter, Peters respectfully urges this Court to consider the direct evidence that shows Respondent wrongfully terminated
him because of his sexual orientation in violation of the MHRA. To be
clear, once Peters has presented direct evidence of discrimination—as he
has sufficiently done here—this Court need not consider the McDonnell
Douglas balancing test that was used by the courts below. See Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (holding that
the shifting burdens of proof described in McDonnell Douglas are not applicable if a plaintiff can cite direct evidence of unlawful discrimination);
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (same); DeBrow
v. Century 21 Great Lakes, Inc., 620 N.W.2d 836, 838 (Mich. 2001)
(“Where direct evidence is offered to prove discrimination, a plaintiff is
not required to establish a prima facie case within the McDonnell Douglas framework, and the case should proceed as an ordinary civil matter.”); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 130 (3d Cir. 1985)
aff’d, 482 U.S. 656 (1987) (“When direct evidence is available, problems
of proof are no different than in other civil cases.”).
First, it is appropriate for this Court to consider the direct evidence
of Respondent’s discrimination. In this context, direct evidence is evidence that “show[s] a specific link between the alleged discriminatory
animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding by a
reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated”
Respondent’s decision to terminate Peters. Thomas v. First Na’l Bank of
Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Philipp v. ANR Freight
Sys., Inc., 61 F.3d 669, 673 (8th Cir.1995)).
Here, Peters has presented sufficient evidence directly showing the
link between Respondent’s discriminatory animus and his termination,
and therefore, summary judgment for Respondent was improper. In fact,
not only were Respondent’s discriminatory motives obvious to its employees but to the public as well. For example, during a public fundraiser for candidate Timmons, who adamantly opposed same sex
marriage, Respondent’s owner, Duffy O’Plenty, proclaimed the following:
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cial position on the issue—”[w]hen a major company executive speaks,
‘everybody listens’ in the corporate hierarchy.” Lockhart v. Westinghouse
Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 54 (3d Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds
as recognized in Starceski v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 54 F.3d 1089,
1099 (3d Cir. 1995). Just because Mr. O’Plenty’s comments hurt Respondent’s subsequent case at trial, Respondent should not be allowed to
“compartmentalize th[e] executive as if he had nothing more to do with
company policy than the janitor or watchman.” Id.; see also Kriss v.
Sprint Commc’ns Co., 58 F.3d 1276, 1282 (8th Cir. 1995) (requiring “conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process
that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude sufficient to permit the factfinder to find that that attitude was
more likely than not a motivating factor in the employer’s decision”) (internal quotations omitted).
Moreover, the direct evidence of Respondent’s discriminatory animus coupled with many other forms of probative evidence regarding Respondent’s discriminatory conduct establish that Peters is entitled to his
just relief. See Mingo v. Urban League of S. Bend, No. 98CV0037 AS,
1994 WL 594611, at *37 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 12, 1994) (“Under the direct
method, a plaintiff may still present circumstantial evidence from which
an inference of intentional discrimination can be drawn.”) (citing Troupe
v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994)). Specifically, as
discussed in greater detail below, (1) Respondent had a history of leniency when dealing with discriminatory behavior, (2) Respondent terminated Peters only after it discovered that he was gay, (3) Respondent
terminated Peters for a relatively minor incident in light of his excellent
record, and (4) Respondent failed to terminate other heterosexual employees who committed analogous mistakes. Although these are just a
few examples of Respondent’s blatant discriminatory attitude, this evidence is clearly “sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact
finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated” Respondent’s decision to terminate Peters. Thomas, 111 F.3d at 66.
Furthermore, because Peters established “through direct evidence
that the employment decision at issue was based upon an impermissible
factor”—Peters’s gay status—the burden shifted to Respondent to
“prov[e] by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the
same employment decision even if it had not taken the impermissible
factor into account.” McCarthy v. Kemper Life Ins. Cos., 924 F.2d 683,
686 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting Randle v. LaSalle Telecomms., Inc., 876 F.2d
563, 568–69 (7th Cir. 1989)); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875
(11th Cir. 1985) (“Where a case of discrimination is proved by direct evidence, the defendant bears a heavier burden.”). Clearly, Respondent has
failed to meet its burden because, in light of the circumstances surrounding Peters’s termination, no rational juror could conclude that sexual ori-
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entation did not play a material role in Respondent’s decision to
terminate Peters.6
It is likely that Respondent will conveniently categorize Mr.
O’Plenty’s offensive statements as “stray remarks” that do not give rise
to liability. See Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir. 1991)
(stating “stray remarks” do not evidence discrimination). However, this
argument fails for two reasons. First, a corporate executive—like Mr.
O’Plenty—who has complete control of his company (including employment policies) and serves as the face of his company, cannot divorce the
statements made on behalf of the company from its actual disposition: in
this case, discriminatory employment practices. See Lockhart, 879 F.2d
at 54; compare Miles, 750 F.2d at 875 (considering the racial slur made
by an official who was closely involved in the hiring decisions as direct
evidence of discrimination), with Staheli v. Univ. of Miss., 854 F.2d 121,
127 (5th Cir. 1988) (excluding statement made by individual with no authority over plaintiff’s tenure), and Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233,
237 (6th Cir. 1983) (excluding comments made by managers not involved
in the decision to discharge plaintiff).
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6. It is important to note that Peters was not required to prove that his sexual orientation was the only factor motivating his termination, as was the case under Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); rather, Peters was only required to establish
that his sexual orientation was one of the factors that got him fired. See, e.g., Stender v.
Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“The Civil Rights Act reverses
or modifies numerous recent Supreme Court cases including Price Waterhouse . . . .”). Section 107 of the Act modifies the Supreme Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse, which held
that an employer could avoid liability for intentional discrimination in ‘mixed motive’ cases
if the employer could demonstrate that the same action would have been taken in the absence of the discriminatory motive. Section 107 states that ‘an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice.’ Id. at n.9 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)) (emphasis added).
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Second, even if this Court was so inclined to entertain Respondent’s
argument, its argument would prove only one thing: there is a genuine
issue of material fact precluding dismissal of this case on summary judgment. See DeBrow, 620 N.W.2d at 839 (reversing summary judgment
when employer claimed that its Vice President’s discriminatory comment
was a “stray remark” and stating that employer’s argument was “an argument for the finder of fact to consider”); Erwin v. Potter, 79 F. App’x
893, 899 (6th Cir. 2003) (reversing summary judgment even though employer’s statement was susceptible to nondiscriminatory interpretations;
stating “assessments about the credibility, or import of statements, are
improper on summary judgment”; and citing Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d
365, 369 (6th Cir. 1999)).
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Even if this Court were to disregard the direct evidence of Respondent’s
discrimination, Peters has clearly satisfied the burdens set forth in the
McDonnell Douglas analytical framework.
Although Peters has sufficiently presented both direct and indirect
evidence of Respondent’s discriminatory animus (rendering any further
analysis wholly unnecessary), Peters submits that he has adequately established his case under the standards set forth in McDonnell Douglas.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the
familiar McDonnell Douglas framework, Peters would bear the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination.
Id. at 802; Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53
(1981). Next, once Peters has established his prima facie case, the burden of production would shift to Respondent “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for Peters’s termination. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. Lastly, if Respondent is able to articulate such reason, Peters would have the opportunity
to prove that Respondent’s “legitimate” reason was not its true reason
but was mere pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 804; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
Peters has presented a prima facie case that proves Respondent
discriminated against him because of his sexual orientation in violation
of the Marshall Human Rights Act.
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In this case, Peters has satisfied the first element of the McDonnell
Douglas test by establishing a prima facie case that Respondent discriminated against him when it terminated his employment. See Burdine,
450 U.S. at 253 (“The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.”). In order to establish a prima facie case,
a plaintiff is only required to show that (1) he is a member of a protected
class, (2) he was performing satisfactorily, (3) he was discharged despite
the adequacy of his work, and (4) a similarly situated employee who was
not a member of the protected group was not discharged. Owens v. Dep’t
of Human Rights, 826 N.E.2d 539, 544 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005); see also
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000).
Further, the “[e]stablishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a
presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee.” Burdine, 450 U.S at 254.
As an initial matter, it is clear that Peters is a member of a protected
class. This fact is undeniably mandated by section 1-102 of the MHRA,
which provides in relevant part that “[i]t is the public policy of [Marshall] . . . [t]o secure for all individuals within the State of Marshall freedom from discrimination against any individual because of his or her . . .
sexual orientation . . . in connection with employment.” (R. at 15, app.
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7. Peters respectfully highlights the great value that Respondent places on its proprietary information; in fact, its principle purpose in installing the Lost & Found® technology
on its mobile devices—an act that prompted this current controversy as well as Peters’s
termination—was to protect such information. (See R. at 5).
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B). Consistent with this policy, the recently revised MHRA dictates that
it is unlawful “[f]or any employer . . . to act with respect to . . . discharge,
discipline, tenure or terms, privileges or conditions of employment on the
basis of unlawful discrimination.” (R. at 10). Therefore, as a gay man,
Peters falls directly under the protections afforded by the MHRA.
Second, it is also clear that Peters’s performance was more than adequate, and thus, he was performing “satisfactorily” under the McDonnell
Douglas test. See Owens, 826 N.E.2d at 544. Peters worked for Respondent for approximately ten years prior to his termination. (R. at 4, 7).
Due to his outstanding work ethic and flawless record, Peters quickly
moved up in the company’s ranks and was eventually promoted to Regional Project Supervisor. (R. at 4–5). Indeed, the only blemish on Peters’s record is the 2010 Event in Petersville. (R. at 6).
Even a superficial look at the circumstances surrounding the Event,
however, shows that the Event stemmed from the concurrence of Respondent’s added impositions and plain bad luck. To be clear, the mistake did not happen during the normal course and scope of Peters’s
employment but during an extraordinary event that Respondent charged
Peters with—in addition to his regular tasks. Further, Respondent was
fully aware that its supplementary tasks were wearing Peters down,
which would indicate to any reasonable person that a mistake was likely
to occur. (See R. at 5–6 (describing Peters’s two separate objections with
his supervisors)). Lastly, on top of the unusual stress, Peter’s beloved
dog died unexpectedly. (R. at 6). Clearly, this “perfect storm” caused
Peters’s mistake, and to a reasonable employer (not looking for a pretext
to fire), this minor mistake would be justifiable or at least excused.
Therefore, it cannot be said that Peters’s job performance was inadequate or unsatisfactory, yet he was terminated nonetheless. (R. at 7).
Lastly, Peters has shown that Respondent gave preferential treatment to other similarly situated, yet heterosexual, employees who committed analogous (or worse) mistakes. (See R. at 7). For example, in
March 2009, Regional Supervisor J. Erwin released confidential proprietary information to a provider via email. (R. at 7). In comparison to Peters’s thirty-minute delay at the Event, Mr. Erwin’s mistake had
extremely drastic consequences for Respondent.7 However, Respondent
merely reassigned Mr. Erwin to another position. (R. at 7). In another
case, Regional Supervisor L. Walker patently discriminated against all
women in the company when he refused to include them for a business
conference. (R. at 7). In the face of multiple complaints filed against the
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company, Respondent neither demoted nor penalized Mr. Walker for his
conduct. (R. at 7). And although Mr. Walker was directed to attend sensitivity training, his “punishment” was apparently a sham because he
never completed the training, yet he was not fired. (R. at 7). Tellingly,
both Mr. Erwin and Mr. Walker were heterosexual individuals who supported candidate Timmons.
Without question, Respondent’s lenient reaction to its heterosexual
supervisors who brought about substantial harm to the company compared to its overly harsh and definite retaliation towards Peters—a homosexual supervisor whose performance had been more than adequate—
irrefutably warrants the conclusion that Respondent harbored anti-gay
sentiments. Alternatively, and at the very least, this evidence “raises an
inference of discrimination” because, if left unexplained, it makes it more
likely than not that Respondent’s decision was based on an impermissible factor—Peters’s sexual orientation. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
Therefore, because Peters has established each of the foregoing factors,
there is a presumption of discrimination that, if Respondent cannot rebut, entitles Peters to relief as a matter of law. Id. (“If the trier of fact
believes the plaintiff’s evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face
of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.”).
Respondent has failed to clearly articulate any legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for firing Peters.
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In light of the fact that Peters has carried his burden of establishing
a prima facie case of discrimination, Respondent was required to rebut
the presumption of discrimination by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to fire Peters. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. To do so, Respondent
must have clearly set forth the reasons for Peters’s termination, and its
explanation must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment in its favor.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 (“[T]he employer need only produce admissible
evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that
the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus.”). Although this burden is not great, it rests upon Respondent all
the same.
There is no doubt that Respondent will immediately point to the
mistake made at the Event in Petersville to justify Peters’s termination.
Admittedly, on its face, the Event could be seen as a motive to terminate;
however, Peters submits that Respondent failed to meet its burden nonetheless because it has not clearly set forth its reasons for terminating
Peters. Without a clear explanation of its logic, Peters will be deprived of
his “full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext.” See id. (stating
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that one reason for the burden-shifting approach is to “frame the factual
issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate pretext”). Merely labeling the Event as a “fiasco”8 does not explain Respondent’s rationale for terminating Peters, a
ten-year veteran of the company. For example, it fails to explain (1) why
Respondent did not immediately fire Peters after the Event but rather,
waited until three weeks after discovering that he was gay, (2) why the
photographs of Peters indicating his sexual orientation were included in
his employee file, which Respondent used in making its decision to terminate Peters, or (3) how the Event was any different than the mistakes
committed by Peters’s heterosexual co-workers. Therefore, because Respondent has failed to satisfy its burden, the court must grant Peters his
just relief. See id. at 254 (“If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff’s evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the
court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.”) (emphasis added).
Respondent’s proffered reason for terminating Peters was a mere
pretext, fabricated to cover up its discriminatory conduct and to escape
liability.
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8. (See R. at 12).
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In the event that this Court finds that Respondent has met its burden in rebutting the presumption of discrimination, it should still reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment because Respondent’s
purported reason was manufactured to avoid liability for its discriminatory conduct. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804 (“While [the discrimination statute] does not, without more, compel rehiring of [or retaining]
respondent, neither does it permit petitioner to use respondent’s conduct
as a pretext for . . . discrimination.”). At this time, it is crucial to note
that this Court may consider all of the relevant evidence presented by
Peters to prove that Respondent’s proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence and that its discriminatory animus was more likely than not
the reason for Peters’s termination. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (stating
that even when the discrimination presumption is rebutted by a defendant, courts “may still consider the evidence establishing the plaintiff’s
prima facie case ‘and inferences properly drawn therefrom . . . on the
issue of whether the defendant’s explanation is pretextual” (citing St.
Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) and Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 255 n.10).
Accordingly, a review of all of the probative evidence that shows Respondent was motivated by its bias and discriminatory disposition
against homosexuals is appropriate. To be clear, the asserted justification for Peters’s termination is based on a single incident, which repre-
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sents a mere speck on his excellent employment record—the Event at
Petersville. Though labeled as a “fiasco,” the unfortunate mishap caused
only a thirty-minute delay to candidate Timmons’s fundraiser. It is
against this backdrop that Respondent argues that this one-time occurrence justified terminating an employee of ten years. As indicated above,
this mix up could have happened to any reasonable person who was
under the amount of stress and grief as Peters. Moreover, Peters informed Respondent on two separate occasions that he was at his limit
mentally and physically, yet Respondent refused to accommodate him.
Considering the fact that Respondent was fully aware of Peters’s concerns, it would be absurd for this Court to accept Respondent’s excuse—
that Peters’s performance was slightly declining, which led to the ultimate blunder—as sufficient justification for its bigotry.
Furthermore, this Court has direct evidence that demonstrates Respondent’s official stance against homosexuality—its owner’s public
statements that “[h]omosexuality is a sin against God” and that “[i]t is
unnatural and detrimental and ultimately destructive to the foundations
of our society.” (R. at 4). The evidence also shows that Respondent had a
history of going easy on discriminatory behaviors. In fact, even after one
of its supervisors blatantly discriminated against every woman that Respondent employed, Respondent barely administered a slap on the wrist.
In addition, when another supervisor leaked confidential information to
an outside source—a danger that Respondent generally took great care
to avoid—the response was a transfer, not termination. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804 (stating that an employer may “justifiably refuse to [retain] one who was engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts against
it, but only if this criterion is applied alike to members of all races”) (emphasis added). Importantly, both of the above-mentioned supervisors
were heterosexual.
Clearly, this evidence is sufficient to discredit Respondent’s asserted
reason for terminating Peters. For, if Peters offered no other evidence
for his position other than the context of his termination coupled with
Respondent’s knowledge of his sexual orientation, the only rational conclusion is that Respondent used Peters’s conduct to cover up its invidious
bias and resulting discrimination against a homosexual employee. But,
even if the foregoing evidence does not establish Respondent’s discrimination as a matter of law, it is at least sufficient to raise a genuine issue
on a material fact; thus, summary judgment was improper. Accordingly,
Peters respectfully asks this Court to reverse the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment and remand this case for trial.
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CONCLUSION
The First District Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Marshall
County Circuit Court’s Order granting Respondent’s motions for summary judgment because Peters has established a prima facie case that
Respondent (1) intruded upon his seclusion and (2) violated the Marshall
Human Rights Act. Alternatively, Peters has raised genuine issues of
material fact with respect to each of his claims. Accordingly, Peters respectfully asks this Court to reverse the appellate court’s decision and
remand this case for trial.
Dated: Monday, October 8, 2012
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/
Counsel for Petitioner,
JACKSON PETERS
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